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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
None are applicable.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section
78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly grant The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's motion

to dismiss where Tan sued The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company after the running of the
statute of limitations, and where the trial court properly found that Tan's amended complaint did
not relate back to the original complaint that was filed one day prior to the running of the
limitations period?
Because "relation back" under Rule 15(c) is a purely legal determination, an appellate
court reviews a trial court's Rule 15(c) relation back analysis for correctness. Porter v. Fox, 101
P.3d 371, 379 (Utah Ct App. 2004) ("a correctness standard applies to a trial court's rule 15(c)
analysis"). In this case, the trial court correctly determined that Tan's amended complaint did
not relate back to the complaint that Tan filed prior to the running of the statute of limitations
because Tan did not commit a technical error in naming "Ohio Casualty Group," and because
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company has no identity of interest with "Ohio Casualty Group."

1

2.

Did the trial court properly grant The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's motion

to dismiss, concluding that Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not control this
matter?
A trial court's determination of whether or not two or more persons are doing business
together for purposes of Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is "a conclusion of law
which . . . [is] review[ed] for correctness." Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389,
1392 (Utah 1996). Here, the trial court properly ruled that Rule 17(d) did not apply in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by Judge Glenn Iwasaki, Third District

Court, granting The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the
statute of limitations had run on Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims and that the amended complaint
did not relate back to the original complaint filed prior to the running of the limitations period.
B.

The Course of Proceedings
Plaintiffs/Appellants Tony Tan and CCI Project Man., Inc., Carl Creer, Fairway

Marketing Strategies, Inc., and Fairway Sales, LLC (collectively "Tan") filed a lawsuit against
John Henry Smith Insurance Company and "Ohio Casualty Group." Tan alleged negligent
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud,
and equitable estoppel against both John Henry Smith Insurance Company and "Ohio Casualty
Group," after coverage was denied on a claim Tan made under a commercial package policy
2

issued to it by The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Tan's claim arose from the theft of 3,580
scooters owned by Tan on December 11, 2000, from a location not covered by the policy. On
December 10, 2003, one day before the statute of limitations ran on Tan's claims, Tan filed suit
("Original Complaint") naming "Ohio Casualty Group." In January 2004, defense counsel filed
a motion to dismiss on grounds that "Ohio Casualty Group"1 was a service mark, not a legal
entity, and that a service mark cannot be sued. In response to the first motion to dismiss, Tan
filed an amended complaint on February 23, 2004 ("Amended Complaint"), naming John Henry
Smith Insurance Company and The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, and asserting the same
causes of action as in the Original Complaint. In March 2004, The Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company filed another motion to dismiss on grounds that Tan failed to sue The Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company prior to the running of the statute of limitations, and that Tan's Amended
Complaint did not relate back to the Original Complaint filed against "Ohio Casualty Group."
The trial court entered an order on October 18, 2004, granting The Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company's motion to dismiss. The trial court's ruling was based on the following
grounds: (a) the statute of limitations had expired by the time Tan named the real party in
interest, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, in Tan's Amended Complaint; (b) Tan failed to
name the real party in interest when it named "Ohio Casualty Group" in its Original Complaint
filed before the running of the statute of limitations; (c) Tan's Amended Complaint did not relate
back, under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, to the Original Complaint because
1

The actual name of the service mark at issue is "The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance Companies." Tan
erroneously refers to this service mark as "Ohio Casualty Group" in its Original Complaint, and in its opening brief
on appeal.

3

Tan's failure to name the real party in interest in the Original Complaint was not a technical
mistake or "misnomer," and because The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company has no "identity of
interest" with "Ohio Casualty Group;" and (d) Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
does not apply.
Following the trial court's dismissal of The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, Tan
continued to litigate the case with John Henry Smith Insurance Company. Ultimately, Tan and
John Henry Smith Insurance Company reached a settlement agreement. On January 6, 2006, the
trial court entered Tan's Stipulation of Dismissal releasing John Henry Smith Insurance
Company per the terms of the settlement agreement. On February 8, 2006, Tan filed its notice of
appeal from the trial court's order dismissing Tan's claims against The Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company.
C.

Facts Relevant to the Issues on Appeal
1.

The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company is an Ohio insurance company providing

coverage for certain risks in Utah and elsewhere. The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance
Companies is a registered service mark that The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, along with
five other insurance companies, is authorized to use in advertising.
2.

The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company issued to Tan a Commercial Package

Policy, policy number BKA (01) 52 80 63 33. Certified Copy of Commercial Package Policy
BKA (01) 52 80 63 63, R. 148-254.

4

3.

Following the December 11, 2000, theft of 3,580 scooters, Tan made a claim on

the policy for coverage and benefits in the amount of $134,015.78. The claim was denied
because the location where the scooters were stored at the time of the theft is not a covered
location under the policy.
4.

On December 10, 2003, one day prior to the expiration of the three-year statute

of limitations, Tan filed a lawsuit against John Henry Smith Insurance Company and "Ohio
Casualty Group" alleging negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and equitable estoppel, and seeking $134,015.78 in
wholesale losses as a result of the theft of the scooters, general damages, punitive damages, preand post-judgment interest, and attorney fees and costs. Original Complaint, R. 1-8.
5.

In response, on January 5, 2004, The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance

Companies filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that "Ohio Casualty Group" is a service mark
that has no legal identity, and that cannot sue or be sued. The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance
Companies' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. 20-34
6.

Thereafter, on January 23, 2004, Tan filed an Amended Complaint, alleging the

same causes of action against John Henry Smith Insurance Company and The Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company. The Amended Complaint was, however, filed after the three-year statute of
limitations had run. Amended Complaint, R. 47-54.
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7.

In March 2004, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company filed a motion to dismiss

on grounds that Tan's Amended Complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired
and that Tan's Amended Complaint did not relate back to Tan's Original Complaint.
8.

Following full briefing and oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the trial court

issued a September 7, 2004, Memorandum Decision granting the motion to dismiss.
Memorandum Decision, R. 365-370.
9.

The trial court entered an order of dismissal on October 18, 2004. Order of

Dismissal, R. 371-374.
10.

The trial court dismissed Tan's case on the following grounds: (a) Tan's Original

Complaint failed to name the real party of interest, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, and
instead, improperly named "Ohio Casualty Group," a service mark that can neither sue, nor be
sued; (b) the statute of limitations on Tan's claims expired one day after the Original Complaint
was filed; (c) Tan's Amended Complaint naming The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company did not
relate back to the Original Complaint because Tan did not make a mere technical mistake in
suing "Ohio Casualty Group," and because The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company does not
have an "identity of interest" for purposes of relation back under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and (d) Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply in this
case. Memorandum Decision at 1-5, R. 365-370.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly dismissed Tan's case against The Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company. Tan's Amended Complaint, which named the real party in interest, The Ohio
Casualty Insurance Company, was filed after the running of the applicable three-year statute of
limitations. Furthermore, Tan's Amended Complaint does not relate back to the Original
Complaint, which was filed one day prior to the expiration of the limitations period, and which
improperly named the service mark "Ohio Casualty Group." The Amended Complaint does not
relate back to the Original Complaint under Rule 15(c), or any other provision of law, because
Tan purposefully sued "Ohio Casualty Group" and did not merely commit a technical error or
"misnomer" in naming "Ohio Casualty Group." Furthermore, The Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company does not have an "identity of interest" with "Ohio Casualty Group" that would allow
relation back to the Original Complaint. The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company is a business
entity authorized to sell insurance in Utah, whereas "Ohio Casualty Group" is merely a service
mark that cannot sue or be sued. Finally, because "Ohio Casualty Group" has no legal identity, it
cannot be associated with or transacting business with The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company,
such that Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure would apply. Therefore, for purposes
of Rule 17(d), naming "Ohio Casualty Group" does not have the same legal effect as naming the
real party in interests, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in granting The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's motion to dismiss and in entering an
order of dismissal.
7

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED TAN'S CASE BECAUSE THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT, WHICH NAMED THE OHIO CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, WAS BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND DID NOT RELATE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT NAMING "OHIO CASUALTY GROUP."
The trial court did not err in dismissing Tan's case because Tan failed to sue The Ohio

Casualty Insurance Company prior to the running of the statute of limitations and Tan's
Amended Complaint did not relate back to the Original Complaint, which named "Ohio Casualty
Group," filed prior to the expiration of the limitations period.
In Utah, Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and cases interpreting that rule,
govern relation back after the statute of limitations has run. Where a plaintiff has, like Tan, sued
a party other than the real party of interest and allowed the statute of limitations to run before
amending the complaint to name the real party in interest, Utah courts allow relation back in two
circumstances: (a) where there has been a technical error or "misnomer," and (b) where the real
party in interest has an "identity of interest" with the erroneously named party. Penrose v. Ross,
71 P.3d 631, 634 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); see also Porter v. Fox, 101 P.3d 371, 380, n.9 (Utah Ct.
App. 2004) (noting that both "misnomer" cases, as well as "identity of interest" cases are both
"analyzed under rule 15(c)").
As will be shown, this case does not present a case of "misnomer" or technical error, and
there is no "identity of interest" between the real party in interest, The Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company, and the improperly named service mark "Ohio Casualty Group." Therefore, under
8

Utah law, Tan's Amended Complaint cannot relate back to the Original Complaint and the trial
court's dismissal of Tan's case should be affirmed.
A.

Tan's Identification Of "Ohio Casualty Group" In The Original Complaint
Does Not Constitute A Misnomer Or Technical Error Under Utah Law, And
Therefore, Tan's Amended Complaint Does Not Relate Back To The
Original Complaint

Tan's attempts to relate the Amended Complaint back to the Original Complaint fail
because Tan did not commit a technical error. To the contrary, Tan purposefully named "Ohio
Casualty Group" in its Original Complaint. Tan's attempts to categorize this matter as just
another case of "misnomer" are not well-taken and should be rejected.
"In the misnomer cases, Utah [courts] have permitted amendments where the [original]
complaint contains a technical defect in the naming or identification of the party." Penrose v.
Ross, 71 P.3d 631, 634 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). A technical defect occurs where the case caption
of the original complaint incorrectly identifies the party, but where the correct party is identified
in the body or text of the original complaint. Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999).
In Sulzen, the plaintiff improperly named the parents of minors who negligently caused
the death of a fellow hiker, but properly identified the minors in the body and text of the
complaint. Id. The Sulzen Court held that under those circumstances, the error was merely
technical and relation back was proper. Id. In this case, Tan not only named "Ohio Casualty
Group" in the caption of the Original Complaint, but also continued to refer to "Ohio Casualty
Group" throughout the text of the Original Complaint, never once making mention of "The Ohio
9

Casualty Insurance Company," the real party in interest. Original Complaint at 2-4, R. 1-9.
Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Sulzen, Tan did not make a technical error by naming "Ohio
Casualty Group." To the contrary, Tan purposefully sued "Ohio Casualty Group" and this Court
should uphold the trial court's determination that Tan's Amended Complaint does not relate back
to the Original Complaint.
Additionally, failure to name the correct party is not considered a mere technical defect
where the Plaintiff has notice of the identity of the real party in interest, but purposefully sues the
incorrect party. Penrose, 71 P.3d 634-35. In Penrose, the plaintiff improperly named the father
of the negligent driver. Id at 633-34. The Penrose Court held that naming the father was not a
technical defect that would allow relation back where the plaintiff knew from the police report
that the negligent driver was the son and failed to name him. LI at 635. Like the plaintiff in
Penrose, Tan had notice that the policy was issue by The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. On
the first page of the insurance policy issued to Tan it is clearly stated:
INSURANCE IS PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY DESIGNATED BELOW
(A stock insurance company, herein called the company)
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Certified Copy of Commercial Package Policy BKA (01) 52 80 63 63, R. 148-254.
Moreover, the following language appears at the top of the Policy Declarations, pages 2 through
8 of the insurance policy:
NAME OF COMPANY THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
IdLR. 149-155.
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Notwithstanding this notice, Tan purposefully sued "Ohio Casualty Group," not The
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Just as the police report in Penrose put plaintiff on notice of
negligent party's identity, the text of the insurance policy clearly and repeatedly provided Tan
with notice that the insurance policy was issued by The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company.
Therefore, Tan did not make a technical error in naming "Ohio Casualty Group" where Tan was
on notice that the real party in interest was The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company.
Tan asserts that "[t]he controlling 'misnomer' case in Utah" is Wilcox v. Geneva Rock
Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1996). Appellant's Brief at 7. Tan attempts to establish that "the
Wilcox case is exactly the same" as the case at bar by setting up a side-by-side comparison of the
facts of the present case and the facts in Wilcox. Id. Tan fails, however, to account for one key
distinguishing fact. In Wilcox, "[t]he complaint incorrectly named as defendant 'Geneva Rock
Corporation, a Utah Corporation,' rather than 'Geneva Rock Products, Inc, a Utah Corporation.'
However, a summons that correctly named Geneva and a copy of the complaint were served . . .
on Geneva Rock Products, Inc." Id. at 368 (emphasis added). In the present case neither the
summons nor the Original Complaint contained any reference to The Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company. Instead, both the summons and the Original Complaint improperly named the service
mark, "Ohio Casualty Group." This fact alone renders Tan's arguments based on Wilcox
inapplicable to this matter. Furthermore, Penrose was decided seven years after Wilcox.
Penrose disallows a plaintiff, who has notice of the identity of the real party in interest, from
naming the wrong party, allowing the statute of limitations to run, and then attempting to relate
11

an amended complaint back. Penrose, 71 P.3d at 635. As discussed above, Tan had notice that
the real party in interest in this case was The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Thus, the trial
court properly relied upon the analysis contained in Penrose and found that Tan's Amended
Complaint could not relate back to the Original Complaint.
In light of the foregoing, this case is not a "misnomer" case or a case involving a mere
technical error. Tan purposefully sued "Ohio Casualty Group." Accordingly, this Court should
affirm the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint does not relate back to the
Original Complaint due to technical error.
B.

The Service Mark "Ohio Casualty Group" Is Not A Legal Entity, Does Not
Have A Legal Identity, Cannot And Does Not Have An Identity of Interest
With The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, And Therefore, Tan's
Amended Complaint Does Not Relate Back To The Original Complaint

Tan asserts in his opening brief that the trial court erred in relying on the "identity of
interest" analysis because "[t]he 'identity of interest' test is used when new parties are
substituted or added" and because in this case "[tjhere has only been one party before the court."
Appellant's Brief at 11. In fact, "Ohio Casualty Group" is separate and distinct from The Ohio
Casualty Insurance Company. As was pointed out both in briefing and oral argument to the trial
court, "Ohio Casualty Group" is a service mark—the service equivalent of a trademark—and
therefore cannot sue, cannot be sued, and cannot have an identity of interest with anyone,
including The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, or any of the other insurance companies
authorized to use the service mark. Tan also asserts in its opening brief, both in the Summary of
Argument section, and elsewhere, that "Ohio Casualty Group" is a "doing business as" or "dba"
12

of The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, and is, therefore, one in the same. Appellant's Brief
at 4,11-13. This assertion is legally incorrect and misleading. The proper description of the
service mark "Ohio Casualty Group" is found in 15 USCA § 1127 (2006), which defines certain
federal trademark terms of art:
The term "service mark" means any word, name, symbol or
device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in
commerce and applies to register on the principle register
established by this Act,
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a
unique service, from the services of others
15 USCA §1127.
A recent federal district court decision in the Tenth Circuit confirms that "a service mark
. . . is not a legal entity capable of being sued." Bishop v. Long Term Disability Income Plan of
SAP America, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19510 at *2, n.l (N.D. Okla., Mar. 2, 2006); see also
Country Rock Cafe, Inc., v. Truck Insur. Exch. and Farmers Insur. Group., 417 F.Supp.2d 399,
401-402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that "Farmers Insurance Group" was a registered service
mark, not a legal entity, and therefore, could not be sued); Danna v. CNA Insur. Co., 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5048, at *2, n.2 (E.D. La., April 11,1996) ("a service mark registered with the
United States Patent and Trademark Agency . . . is not a legal entity . . . [and is] therefore an
improper party to this lawsuit"). Thus, a service mark such as "Ohio Casualty Group" is not a
13

"dba" as Tan asserts. It is simply a logo that a select group of insurance companies have been
authorized to use in advertising. As a service mark, "Ohio Casualty Group" is not a legal entity
and can never be a proper party in any lawsuit. Accordingly, Tan's assertion that the trial court
improperly employed the "identity of interest" analysis because the case at bar only involves a
single party is simply wrong.
The trial court did not err in employing the "identity of interest" test. Furthermore, after
applying the test, the trial court properly determined that "Ohio Casualty Group" does not have
an identity of interest with The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, and therefore, that Tan's
Amended Complaint does not relate back to the Original Complaint by operation of Rule 15(c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Over the years, Utah appellate courts have had several opportunities to address the issue
of "identity of interest" for purposes of relation back under Rule 15(c). In one of the earliest
cases, Attorney General v. Pomerov, 73 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1937), the Utah Supreme Court held
that an identity of interest exists where "the determination of the issues as to any defendant
depends on or affects the determination of the issues as to the other defendants." IdL at 1294.
Similarly, in Nunez v. Albo, 53 P.3d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), the Utah Court of Appeals
determined that an identity of interest existed where the legal positions of the parties were the
same. Finally, in Penrose, the Court held that there is no identity of interest where "a disposition
as to either party does not affect the claims or defenses available to the other party . . . [and]
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where [the parties] do not have the "same legal interest" in the outcome of the case. Penrose, 71
P.3d at 636 (emphasis added).
Tan does not and cannot establish that an identity of interest exists in this case under the
analyses of Pomeroy, Nunez, or Penrose. First, a disposition of the case against "Ohio Casualty
Group" would have no legal effect of any kind on The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company.
Therefore, under Penrose, there is no identity of interest. Next, the positions and defenses of
"Ohio Casualty Group" against Tan's claims are not the same, or even similar, to those of The
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. "Ohio Casualty Group's" defense in this matter is that it is a
service mark that is a non-entity, without assets, unable to sue, and unable to be sued under any
circumstance. On the other hand, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's defense is that it did
not act negligently or improperly, and that even if it did, Tan's Amended Complaint against The
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company was filed after the statute of limitations had run.
Accordingly, a determination of the rights and defenses of "Ohio Casualty Group" in this matter
would not affect the rights or defenses of The Ohio Casualty Insurance in any way, and visa
versa. Therefore, under Pomerov and Nunez there is no identity of interest in this case that
would allow for relation back.
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme
Court faced a slightly different question involving the "identity of interest" test for purposes of
relation back. There, the Court found that an identity of interest exists if "the parties are so
closely related in their business operations that notice of the action against one serves to provide
15

notice of the action to the other. Such an identity exists, for example, between past and present
forms of the same enterprise." Id. at 217. Furthermore, "privity of contract... is an insufficient
identity of interest for the purpose of [relation back] under Rule 15(c). Id. Under Perry, there is
not an identity of interest between "Ohio Casualty Group" and The Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company. First, "Ohio Casualty Group" is a service mark that cannot be a "party" in any sense
of the word. Next, as a mere service mark, "Ohio Casualty Group" is not engaged in any
"business operations" of any kind, and therefore cannot be said to have "business operations"
related to the business operations of The Ohio Casualty Insurance Group, which is in the
business of selling insurance contracts in the State of Utah and elsewhere. Finally, The Ohio
Casualty Insurance Company is not in privity of contract with "Ohio Casualty Group" for
purposes of this case, and even if it was, privity alone is insufficient to establish an "identity of
interest." Thus, Tan cannot establish an identity of interest in this case based on Perry.
Finally, Tan claims in its opening brief that "[t]he trial court's approach was rejected in
Porter v. Fox." Appellant's Brief at 10 (citing Porter v. Fox, 101 P.3d 371 (Utah Ct. App.
2004)). Tan appears to believe that the Porter case somehow overruled Penrose. To the
contrary, when Penrose is Shepardized, it is clear that Porter did not overrule Penrose. In fact,
Porter only cites Penrose once in the context of the proper standard of review to apply in cases
where the statute of limitations has run and a plaintiff attempts to relate back a subsequently filed
amended complaint to the original complaint filed prior to the running of the limitations period.
Porter, 101 P.3d at 379. Ultimately, Porter affirms that the "identity of interest" test is good law
16

in Utah. As Tan concedes in its opening brief, "[i]n Porter, the question was whether a
construction surety had a sufficient 'identity of interest' with the contractor that it insured."
Appellant's Brief at 11. Thus, Utah courts are to apply the "identity of interest" test in cases
where a plaintiff has failed to sue the real party interest prior to the running of the statute of
limitations and then later attempts, as Tan does here, to relate an amended complaint back to the
original complaint to save the plaintiffs claims from operation of the statute of limitations. Id at
381. Because Tan has not and cannot establish that The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company has
an identity of interest with the service mark "Ohio Casualty Group," the trial court properly
found that Tan's Amended Complaint did not related back to the Original Complaint. This Court
should affirm the trial court and uphold the order of dismissal of Tan's case.
II.

THIS CASE IS NOT PROPERLY ANALYZED UNDER RULE 17(d) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THEREFORE, THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISMISSAL OF TAN'S CASE WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE
UPHELD.
Alternatively, Tan argues that it properly named The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company

in the Original Complaint when it named "Ohio Casualty Group" because, under Rule 17(d) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company was "associated in
. . . business with" "Ohio Casualty Group" such that suing the one is as good as suing the other.
Tan's assertion is without merit.
Under Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by a common name. When
two or more persons associated in any business either as a jointstock company, a partnership or other association, not a
17

corporation, transact such business under a common name,
whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they
may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment
obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all
the associates in the same manner as if all had been named parties
and had been sued upon their joint liability.
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d).
Directly stated, this rule does not apply to the case at bar. As has been explained in great
detail above, "Ohio Casualty Group" is a service mark. The service mark "Ohio Casualty
Group" has no legal identity. It is not a "person" in any sense of the word. It is not a "business"
in any sense of the word. It is not a "dba" of The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. It has no
assets or "property." It cannot enter into partnerships or other associations of any kind with an
actual business entity. It cannot sue or be sued. Because it cannot be sued, no judgment of any
kind may be obtained against it in any court of law. Therefore, it is impossible for a judgment
against "Ohio Casualty Group" to bind The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company.
In short, Rule 17(d) does not and cannot apply to this case. Accordingly, the trial court
properly dismissed Tan's case and this Court should affirm that result.

18

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the trial court and uphold the trial court's dismissal of Tan's case.
DATED this 21st day of July, 2006.
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C.

Barbate KMterret
Nathan C. Croxford
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company
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United States District Court,N.D. Oklahoma.
Kurt Anthony BISHOP, Plaintiff,
v.
LONG TERM DISABILITY INCOME PLAN OF
SAP AMERICA, INC., an Erisa qualified plan
administered by SAP American, Inc., Life Insurance
Company of North America, and Cigna, Defendants.
No. 04-CV-0031-CVE-SAJ.
March 2, 2006.
Jessica Eileen Rainey, Ray Thompson Hillis, Titus
Hillis Reynolds Love Dickman & McCalmon,
Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff.
Anthony L. Gallia, Matthew A. Taylor, Duane
Morris LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Donald Mitchell
Bingham, James Ronald Polan, Riggs Abney Neal
Turpen Orbison & Lewis, Tulsa, OK, for
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
EAGAN, Chief J.
*1 Plaintiff filed this action to recover benefits and
enforce his rights under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 et
seq. ("ERISA"). Plaintiff challenges the decision by
The Life Insurance Company of North America ("
LINA") to terminate his long-term disability ("LTD"
) benefits under the Long Term Disability Income
Plan of SAP America, Inc. (the "Plan") . FN1
FN1. Defendants ask the Court to dismiss
CIGNA as a named defendant. Dkt. # 27,
at 4 n. 1. LINA asserts that CIGNA is
merely a service mark used by LINA and
is not a legal entity capable of being sued.
Id; see Adm. Rec. at 215. Without
objection, the Court dismisses CIGNA as a
party in this action.

Plaintiff was hired by SAP America, Inc. ("SAP")
in 1994 as a technology consultant. According to
SAP, the essential duties of technology consultant
included providing technical expertise, database
administration, paperwork, and "extensive travel."
Administrative Record ("Adm.Rec") at 220-23.
This job description is an internal SAP document
independent from the Plan. Id at 223. In contrast to
the SAP description, the Department of Labor's
Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") rates
the position of technology consultant as sedentary
and does not include the travel requirement. Id. at
349. In January 2001, SAP accommodated
plaintiffs medical conditions by permitting him to
work as a technology consultant without requiring
him to travel. See id. at 172, 225. Due to corporate
restructuring, SAP eliminated plaintiffs position in
June 2001 and plaintiff was terminated from payroll
effective January 1, 2002. Id at 219, 305. Plaintiffs
annual salary had been approximately $85,000.
Adm. Rec. at 117.
As an eligible SAP employee, plaintiff became a
participant in the Plan, which provides short term
disability ("STD") and LTD benefits to qualified
participants. Id. at 8-36. As an active full-time
employee earning more than $60,000, plaintiff was
classified as a Group 1 Plan participant. Id. at 14.
SAP designated LINA as the independent claims
administrator of the Plan. Id. at Supp.l. LINA is a
multi-million dollar corporation which operates
under the CIGNA service mark and issues insurance
plans nationwide. LINA is both the claims
administrator and the insurer of the Plan. Id. The
Plan grants LINA discretion "to interpret the terms
of the Plan documents, to decide questions of
eligibility for coverage or benefits under the Plan,
and to make any related findings of fact." Adm.
Rec. at Supp.l.
Plaintiff filed a claim for STD benefits in July 2001.
Id. at 126-27. Plaintiffs medical records indicate
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that plaintiff suffered from pulmonary disease,
chronic asthma, allergies, osteoporosis, intestinal
problems, depression, hypertension, migraine
headaches, and chronic back pain. Id. at 172-74.
LINA assigned Daniel A. Nackley, M.D., to review
plaintiffs file. Id. Dr. Nackley concluded:
It is anticipated that should he have a sedentary job
with which he did not have to perform any
significant degree of ambulation, lifting, or
carrying, he could perform adequately. However, it
is expected that his condition will worsen such that
the combination of his impairments would affect his
functionality with regard to any type of work.
*2 Lastly, the medical on file documents an
impairment such that his ability to travel for his
work would be affected in a significant fashion.
Id. at 174. Based on Dr. Nackley's review, LINA
approved plaintiffs STD claim on October 25,
2001. Adm. Rec. at 175. It renewed his STD
benefits on December 27, 2001. Id. at 185.
Plaintiffs STD benefits bridged over into LTD
benefits as of February 21, 2002. Id. at 249. In
March 2002, the Social Security Administration ("
SSA") denied plaintiffs application for disability
benefits, finding that a[b]ased on your description
of the work you performed as a consultant for
several years, evidence indicates that you are
capable of doing this type of work." Id. at 301-04.
In August 2002, plaintiffs primary physician,
Kenneth W. Piper, M.D., submitted a physical
abilities assessment ("PAA") form. Id. at 291-92.
The PAA asks a physician to identify his or her
patient's level of physical work function for an eight
hour workday. Dr. Piper indicated that plaintiff was
capable of "sedentary" activities as of August 2002.
Adm. Rec. at 291-92.
In August 2003, LINA requested supplemental
medical records from plaintiff. In response, Dr.
Piper
submitted
medical
notes
regarding
improvements in plaintiffs health, such as "superb"
blood pressure. Id. at 332-33. Dr. Piper wrote that "
we are clearly moving away from a state of severe
chronic asthma into much improved status" and "
everything is going well." Id. In September 2003,
Dr. Piper submitted a PAA wherein he identified
plaintiff as capable of "light" physical work, which

is one step above "sedentary." Id. at 339-40. On this
2003 PAA, Dr. Piper noted that plaintiff was
capable of:
Sitting: continuously (i.e., 5.5 + hours out of 8);
Standing: frequently (2.5-5 hours out of 8);
Walking: occasionally (less than 2.5 hours out of 8);
Balancing: occasionally (less than 2.5 hours out of
8);
Kneeling: occasionally (less than 2.5 hours out of 8);
Hearing: continuously (i.e., 5.5 + hours out of 8);
Reaching: occasionally (less than 2.5 hours out of
8);

Seeing: continuously (i.e., 5.5 + hours out of 8);
Smelling/tasting: continuously (i.e., 5.5 + hours out
of 8);
Use of lower extremities: frequently (2.5-5 hours
out of 8);
Exposure to vibration: frequently (2.5-5 hours out
of 8);
Can work around machinery: frequently (2.5-5
hours out of 8).
Id. In addition, LINA asked Dr. Piper directly
whether plaintiff was "able to use fine manipulation
at desk level" and he responded "Yes." Adm. Rec.
at 342. Based on these medical records, LINA
determined that plaintiff was not "totally disabled"
under the Plan and terminated plaintiffs LTD
benefits on September 25, 2003. Id. at 345-47.
Plaintiff immediately appealed. Id. at 351-52.
For Group 1 employees, the Plan defines "Total
Disability" as follows:
An Employee will be considered Totally Disabled
if, because of Injury or Sickness, he is unable to
perform all the essential duties of his occupation.
*3 Id. at 11. The parties dispute the definition of "
his occupation" and whether plaintiff qualifies as "
totally disabled." Plaintiff argues that "his
occupation" requires him to travel, while defendants
classify plaintiffs occupation as sedentary. LINA
interprets these terms of the Plan based on the DOT
definition and SAP's accommodation which waived
plaintiffs travel requirement.
Upon appeal, plaintiff failed to provide medical
documentation requested by LINA. In its notice of
termination, LINA advised plaintiff to provide any
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and all medical documentation that he felt
supported his LTD claim, including "Medical
Office notes from January, 2003 through present [,]
Objective test results such as MRIs, x-rays, etc
[and a] narrative from your physician outlining your
level of functioning and explaining how your
present condition limits you from your job duties "
Id at 346-47 This notice also informed plaintiff of
his rights under ERISA Adm Rec at 347 At this
stage, the only documentation plaintiff submitted
was a letter from Dr Piper statmg that "[although
[Bishop's] physical work level would theoretically
allow him to perform some sedentary or light work,
I am not clearing him to return him to the
workplace In my opinion, his complex medical
problems would deteriorate rapidly if he were
forced to attempt even sedentary activities " Id at
353 In this letter, Dr Piper confirmed that he
authored the 2003 PAA, which designated plaintiff
as capable of light work Id Dr Piper did not
submit an amended or corrected PAA despite
LINA's instruction Citmg Dr Piper's confirmation
of the 2003 PAA and the lack of any medical
evidence to support the physician's speculation on
the possibility of future deterioration, LINA upheld
the termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits on
December 11,2003 Id at 362-63
II
On January 14, 2004, plaintiff filed suit, alleging
that defendants violated 29 U S C § 1132 in
terminating his LTD benefits As a plan beneficiary,
plaintiff has the right to federal court review of
benefit denials and terminations under ERISA "
ERISA was enacted to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee
benefit plans, and to protect contractually defined
benefits " Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v Bruch,
489 U S 101, 113, 109 S Ct 948, 103 LEd2d 80
(1989) Specifically, section 1132(a)(1)(B) grants
plaintiff the right "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan" A
termination of benefits challenged under section
1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under an arbitrary
and capricious standard when a plan gives the
© 2006 ThomsonAVest No

claims administrator discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of a plan See Firestone, 489 US at 115 The
parties do not dispute that the Plan gave LINA such
discretionary authonty
*4 The issue, then, is whether LINA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it made the final
decision to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits on
December 11, 2003 Under the two-tier "sliding
scale" approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit, an "
additional reduction in deference is appropriate"
where there is an inherent or proven conflict of
interest Fought v Unum Life Ins Co of America,
379 F3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir2004) It is
undisputed that LINA has an inherent conflict of
interest as it is both payor and administrator of the
Plan As such, there is a reduction in deference to
the administrator's decision and LINA bears the
burden of proving "that its interpretation of the
terms of the plan is reasonable and that its
application of those terms to the claimant is
supported by substantial evidence " Id
The determinative inquiry m this case is whether
LINA's decision was supported by substantial
evidence " 'Substantial evidence is such evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support the conclusion reached by the
[decisionmaker]' Substantial evidence requires '
more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance "
' Sandoval v Aetna Life and Cas Inc Co, 967
F2d 377, 382 (10th Cir 1992) (internal citations
omitted) "Evidence is not substantial 'if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence-particularly certain
types of evidence {eg, that offered by treating
physicians), or if it really constitutes not evidence
but mere conclusion " ' Knipe v Heckler, 755 F 2d
141, 145 (10th Cirl985) (citation omitted)
Medical information offered by a Plan participant's
primary physician is to be considered, but it is not
entitled to special deference Black & Decker
Disability Plan v Nord, 538 U S 822, 832, 123
S Ct 1965, 155 L Ed 2d 1034 (2003)
The Court gives less deference to an administrator's
conclusions if the administrator fails to gather or
examine relevant evidence See Caldwell v Life Ins
Co of North America, 287 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th
to Orig U S Govt Works
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Cir 2002), Kimber v Thiokol Corp, 196 F 3d 1092,
1097 (10th Cirl999) The Court considers the
record as a whole, but the Court considers only that
information available to the plan administrator at
the time the decision was made Hall v Unum Life
Ins Co of Am, 300 F 3d 1197, 1201 (10th
Cir 2002) An administrator's decision "need not be
the only logical one nor even the best one,"
Woolsey v Marion Labs, Inc, 934 F 2d 1452,
1460 (10th Cir 1991)
HL
ERISA was enacted to protect contractual rights
and, consequently, the terms of the Plan dictate See
Firestone, 489 US at 113 LINA has discretionary
authority to interpret the terms of the Plan LINA's
interpretation of "his occupation" of technology
consultant to be sedentary is reasonable To support
their interpretation of Plan terminology, LINA cites
the DOT definition of "technology consultant"
which omits any travel requirement See Gallagher
v Reliance Standard Life Ins Co, 305 F 3d 264,
271 (4th Cir 2002) (where the "only significant
discrepancy between the job description adopted by
[defendant] and [employer's] description of
[plaintiffs] actual job is the failure of the former to
include the travel requirement," defendant's
adoption of the DOT definition was reasonable)
Further, at the time plaintiff filed his initial
disability benefits claim, his job did not require him
to travel Given the sedentary nature of plaintiffs
occupation, LINA acted reasonably in terminating
his LTD benefits after receiving confirmation that
plaintiff was capable of light work, which is a
higher level of ability than sedentary
*5 Physician reports m 2002 and 2003 classify
plaintiff as capable of working at a sedentary work
level or greater In Fall 2003, Dr Piper submitted
evidence of plaintiffs improved physical status,
plaintiffs ability to perform more than sedentary
activities, and plaintiffs ability to use fine
manipulation at desk level At this time, LINA was
aware that SSA had demed plaintiffs disability
claim The SSA uses an "any occupation" standard
rather than a "his occupation" standard adopted by
the Plan Therefore, SSA's denial of plaintiff s claim
© 2006 ThomsonAVest No

for disability benefits may be persuasive, but it is
not determinative See Pack v Michehn Retirement
Plan, 229 F 3d 1164 (10th Cir 2000) ("There is no
evidence that [defendant] placed any conclusive or
otherwise undue reliance on this particular [SSA]
report, or that its consideration of this report
rendered its denial of benefits arbitrary and
capncious ")
On appeal, LINA asked both plaintiff and his
primary physician to submit medical evidence to
support plaintiffs qualification for LTD benefits
under the Plan However, plaintiff failed to produce
evidence that he was "unable to perform all the
essential duties of his occupation" LINA
specifically requested objective test results, but
plaintiff failed to deliver The only "evidence"
plaintiff submitted was Dr Piper's subjective letter
on appeal which opined that he would not release
plaintiff to work Dr Piper's opinions that he would
not personally elease plaintiff to return to work is
irrelevant to the issue of whether plaintiff met the
Plan's definition of "totally disabled" The Plan
does not reference a physician's release to return to
work but rather focuses on ability to conduct work
activities Evidence of plaintiffs capacity to
perform in "his occupation" was substantial
Therefore, LINA acted reasonably in terminating
plaintiffs LTD benefits
IV
In summary, defendants' decision to terminate
plaintiffs LTD benefits is an exercise of the
discretion granted by the Plan Viewing the record
as a whole, LINA relied upon substantial evidence
to interpret the terms of the Plan and to conclude
that plaintiff did not meet the Plan's definition of "
totally disabled" The Court finds that defendants'
decision to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits was
not arbitrary and capncious This finding is based
on the medical evidence submitted to and reviewed
by LINA and does not rely upon the SSA
determination
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants'
December 11, 2003 final decision to terminate
plaintiffs LTD benefits is hereby AFFIRMED A
to Orig U S Govt Works
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separate judgment is filed herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that CIGNA is
dismissed as a party to this action as it is a service
mark and not a legal entity capable of suing or
being sued.
N.D.Okla.,2006.
Bishop v. Long Term Disability Income Plan of
SAP America, Inc.
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 521506 (N.D.Okla.)
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entity capable of being sued.
Briefs and Other Related Documents
[2] Federal Courts 170B €==>34
United States District Court,S.D. New York.
COUNTRY ROCK CAFE, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE and Farmers
Insurance Group, Defendants.
No. 05 Civ. 8924(WCC).
Feb. 22, 2006.
Background: Insured brought action to recover
under commercial general liability policy after a fire
damaged its property. Defendants moved to dismiss.

170B Federal Courts
170BI Jurisdiction and Powers in General
170BI(A) In General
170Bk29 Objections to Jurisdiction,
Determination and Waiver
170Bk34 k. Presumptions and Burden
of Proof Most Cited Cases
Jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that
showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings
inferences favorable to the party asserting it.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
[3] Federal Courts 170B €=^33

Holdings: The District Court, William C. Conner,
Senior District Judge, held that:
1(1) "Farmers Insurance Group," a service mark
used by corporation that provided insurance
management services to various member insurers,
was not an entity capable of being sued, and
4(2) insurer, as reciprocal or interinsurance
exchange
organized
under
California's
Interinsurance Law, was a citizen of New York for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

170B Federal Courts
170BI Jurisdiction and Powers in General
170BI(A) In General
170Bk29 Objections to Jurisdiction,
Determination and Waiver
170Bk33 k. Affidavits and Evidence in
General. Most Cited Cases
When determining whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists, a court may properly refer to
evidence beyond the pleadings to resolve disputed
jurisdictional
facts. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
[4] Federal Courts 170B €^>301

Motion granted.
West Headnotes
[1] Insurance 217 €=>3567
217 Insurance
217XXXI Civil Practice and Procedure
217k3567 k. Parties. Most Cited Cases
"Farmers Insurance Group" service mark used by
corporation that provided insurance management
services to various member insurers was not an

170B Federal Courts
170BIV Citizenship, Residence or Character of
Parties, Jurisdiction Dependent on
170BIV(B) Controversies Between Citizens
of Different States
170Bk296 Corporations
170Bk301 k. Statutory Exceptions;
National Banks and Liability Insurers. Most Cited
Cases
Insurer, as reciprocal or interinsurance exchange
organized under California's Interinsurance Law,
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was a citizen of New York for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction in action brought against it by insured,
where insured, as member of the exchange, was
citizen of New York. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332; West's
Ann.Cal.Ins.Code § 1303.
[5] Federal Courts 170B €=^302
170B Federal Courts
170BIV Citizenship, Residence or Character of
Parties, Jurisdiction Dependent on
170BIV(B) Controversies Between Citizens
of Different States
170Bk302 k. Unincorporated Associations
and Partnerships. Most Cited Cases
Unincorporated association, for diversity purposes,
is a citizen of each state in which it has members.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332.
[6] Federal Courts 170B €^14.1
170B Federal Courts
170BI Jurisdiction and Powers in General
170BI(A) In General
170Bkl4
Jurisdiction
of
Entire
Controversy; Pendent Jurisdiction
170Bkl4.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When
determining
whether
to
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, a district court has
considerable discretion over what state law claims it
will include within its supplemental jurisdiction in a
particular case. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3).
Trademarks 382T €^1800
382T Trademarks
382TXI Trademarks and Trade Names
Adjudicated
382Tkl800 k. Alphabetical Listing. Most
Cited Cases
Farmers Insurance Group.
*400 Edward H. Odesser, LLC (Gary J. Langer,
Edward H. Odesser, of counsel), White Plains, NY,
for Plaintiff.
Lustig & Brown, LLP (Sherri N. Pavloff, of
counsel), New York City, for Defendants.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM C. CONNER, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Country Rock Cafe, Inc. brings this action
seeking relief for breach of contract and requesting
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against
defendants Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE") and
Farmers Insurance Group ("Farmers") (collectively,
"defendants"), based on an insurance policy issued
by defendants to plaintiff. Plaintiff commenced
this action on October 20, 2005, seeking to collect
under that insurance policy after a fire damaged
plaintiffs property. This matter is before this Court
based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332. Defendants now seek to dismiss the action
on the grounds that: (1) Farmers was improperly
named as a party; (2) there is no subject matter
jurisdiction as diversity does not exist between
plaintiff and TIE; (3) the second cause of action for
equitable and injunctive relief is invalid; and (4)
plaintiff cannot prove punitive, exemplary or
special damages. For the reasons stated herein,
defendants' motion is granted.

BACKGROUND
In March 2004, the parties entered into an insurance
agreement (the "policy") under which plaintiff
would make premium payments to defendants in
exchange for commercial general liability insurance
coverage. *401 (Complt.^J
13.) The policy
provided an aggregate limit of $1 million coverage
for business and property loss from fire until the
policy's expiration March 12, 2005. (Id. ffil 14>
15.) On January 6, 2005, there was a fire at Country
Rock Cafe, prompting plaintiff to file an insurance
claim requesting coverage in excess of
$160,000.00. (Id. Yh 16, 17.) Defendants, on
February 28, 2005, rejected the claim, stating that
the policy was not in effect after December 17,
2004. (Id.^ 18.)
Plaintiff claims that Christopher O'Brien, an agent
of Farmers, requested that plaintiff send its
premium payments to O'Brien's office, and that
plaintiff subsequently made timely payments. (Id.
\% 19, 20; Defs. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex.
A.) Plaintiff asserts that it is standard practice to
furnish payments to an agent of the insurance
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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carrier, and that this was the pattern of practice
between the parties (Complt^ 21, 22)
According to plaintiff, defendants also debited
plaintiffs account for "reinstatement charges from
September 27 to December 11, 2004" (Id K 23)
The total amount debited was $703 76, in addition
to which premium charges from December 12, 2004
to January 11, 2005 in the amount of $278 08 were
also debited (Id) The total amount due to Farmers,
after credits and charges on another Farmers' policy
were accounted for, was $489 97 (Id) Plaintiff
issued a check m that amount made payable to "
Farmer Ins " on December 2, 2004, this check was
deposited and cleared (Id ffi[ 24, 25, 26)
Plaintiff believed that this check "timely tendered
payment in full for insurance coverage for the time
penod that includes the subject date of loss " (Id ^
24) This check allegedly included an insurance
premium payment by plaintiff that covered January
6, 2005-the date of the fire (Id % 27 )
DISCUSSION
L Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2)
[1] Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing this
Court's jurisdiction over defendants See Metro
Life Ins Co v Robertson-Ceco Corp 84 F 3d 560,
566 (2d Cir 1996) The nature of the plaintiffs
obligation, however, "vanes depending on the
procedural posture of the litigation" Ball v
Metallurgy Hoboken-Overpelt, SA, 902 F 2d 194,
197 (2d Cir 1990) Prior to discovery, a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) may be defeated
if the plaintiffs complamt and affidavits contam
sufficient allegations, made in good faith, to
establish a prima facie showmg of jurisdiction See
id Moreover, the court must assume the truth of
the plaintiffs factual allegations See id
Generally, an entity may be sued in federal court if
it has the capacity to be sued under the laws of the
state where it was created See Fed R Civ P 17(b)
, Rowland v Cal Men's Colony, Unit II Men's
Advisory Council, 506 US 194, 214, 113 S Ct
716, 121 L Ed 2d 656 (1993)
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Defendants claim that "Farmers Insurance Group is
a federally registered service mark used as a logo
for marketing purposes," and, therefore, is not an
entity capable of being sued (Defs Mem Supp
Mot Dismiss at 4-5) Plaintiff concedes that
Farmers Insurance Group is a service mark, but
asserts that defendants cannot establish that it is not
also a legal entity (PI Mem Opp Mot Dismiss at
2 ) However, in support of their position defendants
provide an affidavit from Adam G Morris,
Assistant Secretary of the attorney-in-fact for TIE,
as well as documents from the United States Patent
and Trademark Office and the State of California
(Defs Mem Supp Mot Dismiss, Exs B, C ) The
service mark registration form from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office mdicates that
Farmers Insurance *402 Group is a service mark
owned by Farmers Group, Inc (Id, Ex B) In
addition, a Special Certificate from the State of
California Department of Insurance and a
Certificate of Nonfiling Corporation from the
Secretary of State indicate that Farmers Insurance
Group is not, nor ever has been, a corporation
licensed to transact business in California™1 (Id,
Ex C)

FN1 As plaintiff indicates, the copies of
these documents are dated 1996 and 1998
(Defs Mem Supp Mot Dismiss, Ex
C)
However, there has been nothing produced
to indicate that the assertions m these
documents are now false or that Farmers
Insurance Group has subsequently become
a company licensed to do business m
California
Farmers Group, Inc, a subsidiary of Zurich
Fmancial Services, a Swiss msurance company,
operates under the service mark Farmers Insurance
Group, providing management services to various
member
companies,
including
TIE
(www hoovers com (search for "Farmers Insurance
Group")) Farmers Group, Inc "is a provider of
msurance management services and a holdmg
company" that acts as attorney-in-fact for three
reciprocal msurance exchanges, including TIE
(www farmers com (follow "About Farmers"
hyperlink)) As defendants indicate, "industry
to Ong U S Govt Works
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publications establish that the 'attorney in fact' [for
TIE] is 'Farmers Group Inc.' (not to be confused
with 'Farmers Insurance Group', the service mark
incorrectly named by plaintiff as a defendant in this
suit), doing business as 'Truck Underwriters
Association.' " (Defs. Reply Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss at 3.) Although Farmers Group Inc. may be
a proper party to this action, that question is not
before this Court. As the evidence provided by
defendants indicates, plaintiff is unable to establish
a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Farmers.
Therefore, Farmers is not a proper party to this
action.
II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1)
[2][3][4] When considering a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), a court must "accept as true all material
factual allegations in the complaint." Shipping Fin.
Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d
Cir.1998) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974),
overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468
U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)).
However,
"jurisdiction
must
be
shown
affirmatively, and that showing is not made by
drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to
the party asserting it." Drakos, 140 F.3d at 129
(citing Norton v. Larney, 266 U.S. 511, 515, 45
S.Ct. 145, 69 L.Ed. 413 (1925)). When
determining whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists, a court may properly refer to evidence
beyond the pleadings to resolve disputed
jurisdictional facts. See Makarova v. United States,
201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). "Thus, the
standard used to evaluate a Rule 12(b)(1) claim is
akin to that for summary judgment under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)." Serrano v. 900 5th Ave. Corp.,
4 F.Supp.2d 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y.1998). Plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing the court's
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 (2d
Cir.1996).
[5] In addition to providing the affidavit of Morris,
defendants have provided a copy of the report from
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

Best's Insurance Reports, which indicates that TIE
is a reciprocal or interinsurance exchange organized
under California's Interinsurance Law. (Defs. Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A; Defs. Reply Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A.) Under California's
Insurance Code, a reciprocal or interinsurance
exchange *403 permits subscribers to exchange
contracts and is the "insurer" whereas each
subscriber is the "insured." Cal. Ins.Code § 1303
(2005). "The exchange may sue or be sued in its
own name as in the case of an individual. Any
judgment rendered against the exchange shall be
binding upon each subscriber only in such
proportion as his interests may appear." Cal.
Ins.Code § 1450 (2005). TIE "is a reciprocal
insurance exchange composed of a number of
members acting as an unincorporated association."
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Dow Chem. Co., 331 F.Supp.
323, 324 (W.D.Mo.1971). An unincorporated
association, for diversity purposes, is a citizen of
each state in which it has members. See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382
U.S. 145, 146-47, 86 S.Ct. 272, 15 L.Ed.2d 217
(1965); Baer v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d
393, 395 (2d Cir. 1974).
Plaintiff, a New York citizen insured by TIE, is a
member of TIE. (Complt.^J 10.) TIE is, therefore,
a citizen of New York because at least one of its
members, plaintiff, is a citizen of New York. Since
TIE, the only remaining defendant, see infra Part I.,
has the same citizenship as plaintiff, there is no
diversity between the parties. As this Court no
longer has jurisdiction over this action, we will not
consider the other issues raised by defendants in
their motion papers.
Ill, Remaining State Law Claims
[6] A district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it "has
dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When
determining whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, a district court has "considerable
discretion over what state law claims it will include
within its supplemental jurisdiction in a particular
case." Yaba v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Toft,
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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417FSupp2d399
(Cite as: 417 F.Supp.2d 399)
931 FSupp 271, 275 (SDNY1996) (quoting
Cushing v Moore, 970 F 2d 1103, 1110 (2d
Cir 1992)) Accordingly, as all federal claims have
been dismissed, we exercise our discretion and
declme to retam supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiffs remaining state law breach of contract
claim
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion of
defendants Truck Insurance Exchange and Farmers
Insurance Group is granted, and the action is
dismissed in its entirety The dismissal is without
prejudice, except for the claim against Farmers
Insurance Group, which is dismissed with prejudice
SO ORDERED
S D N Y ,2006
Country Rock Cafe, Inc v Truck Ins Exchange
417 FSupp 2d 399
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top)
• 2006 WL 548480 (Trial Motion, Memorandum
and Affidavit) Reply Memorandum of Law in
Further Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(Jan 13,2006)
• 2005 WL 3784448 (Trial Pleading) Complaint
(Oct 20, 2005)
• 7 05cv08924 (Docket) (Oct 20, 2005)
• 2005 WL 3832206 (Trial Motion, Memorandum
and Affidavit) Plaintiff s Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (2005) Original
Image of this Document (PDF)
END OF DOCUMENT
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(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp,)

H
Briefs and Other Related Documents
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.
Gary DANNA, Sr.
v.
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY and Continental
Casualty Company
Civ. A. No. 95-3061.

summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs state law
claims against CCC because the state law claims
alleged in plaintiffs Petition for Damages are
preempted by ERISA. In addition, CCC moves for
summary judgment dismissing the remainder of
Danna's claims on the grounds that Danna is not "
disabled" as required by the CCC disability policy
and is therefore not entitled to benefits under that
policy.

April 12,1996.
II. DISCUSSION
ORDER AND REASONS
BERRIGAN, District Judge:
*1 Defendant Continental Casualty Company ("CCC
") moves for summary judgment on the grounds that
the state law claims alleged in plaintiffs Petition for
Damages are preempted by the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"
), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Defendant further alleges
that it is entitled to summary judgment as plaintiff is
not "disabled" as required by the disability
insurance policy issued by CCC. The matter was
submitted on a previous date without oral argument.
Having reviewed the record, the submissions of the
parties and the applicable law, defendant's motion is
GRANTED.™1

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gary Danna ("Danna") initiated this action
on August 24, 1995 to recover benefits to which he
was allegedly entitled under the terms of the policy
of disability insurance issued by CCC to his
employer, Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.™2 On
September 18, 1995, CCC removed this case to
federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)
because the plan of insurance which allegedly
insured Danna is governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §
1001 et seq. as well as diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. CCC now moves for

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that summary judgment is proper "if the
pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." The non-mo vant's
burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact "
is not satisfied with 'some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts,' by 'conclusory allegations,' or by
only a 'scintilla' of evidence." Little v. Liquid Air
Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(e«
banc). Further, "factual controversies [are resolved]
in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when
there is an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory
facts." Id.
In essence, "[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for
a trial — whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved
only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party"
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 250,
106 S.Ct. 2505,2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
Under these standards, the Court finds that there are
no genuine issues of material fact as to plaintiffs
disability, and defendant is therefore entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.1^3 Pursuant to the

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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CCC policy, a claimant is entitled to benefits if he
or she is totally disabled The policy provides that
*2 "Total Disability" means that, the Insured
Employee, because of Injury or Sickness, is
(1) continuously unable to engage in any occupation
for which he is or becomes qualified by education,
training or experience, and
(2) under the regular care of a licensed physician
other than himself FN4
The Court finds that plaintiff is not disabled within
the meaning of the CCC policy as plaintiff is not
under the regular care of a licensed physician
Defendant indicates, and plaintiff does not dispute,
that plaintiff was not under the care of a physician
when he was denied disability benefits as required
under the disability policy Danna was denied
disability benefits on July 3, 1995 and on that date,
the last medical record which Danna submitted to
CCC was dated August 24, 1994 FN5 Although a
claim form dated November 22, 1994 was
completed by Dr Russo, plaintiffs physician, there
is no indication that plaintiff was present or was
treated that day™ 6 Because pursuant to the CCC
policy, a claimant is only entitled to benefits if he or
she is under the regular care of a licensed physician
other than himself, and Danna had not been treated
m eleven months, Danna no longer met the
definition of "disabled" under the CCC policy as of
July 3, 1995 Therefore, at the time that plaintiffs
disability benefits were terminated, plaintiff was not
disabled withm the meaning of disability under
defendant's disability policy
III CONCLUSION
The Court finds that at the time that plaintiffs
benefits were terminated, he did not meet the
definition of disabled as provided for under the
CCC policy as plaintiff was not under the regular
care of a licensed physician at that time

FN1 The Court notes that plaintiff has not
filed an opposition to defendant's motion
for summary judgment Rather, the Court
has received a letter from plaintiffs
attorney to the effect that plaintiff will not
be
submitting
any
opposition
to
defendant's motion based upon the
deposition testimony of Dr Courtney
Russo, plaintiffs physician
FN2 Plaintiff originally sued CNA
Insurance Company However, CNA is a
service mark registered with the United
States Patent and Trademark Agency and
is not a legal entity CNA was therefore an
improper party to this suit The plaintiff
and CNA filed a Jomt Motion to Dismiss
CNA, and the plaintiff amended his
petition to name CCC as the proper party
defendant SeeR Doc 9
FN3 Because the Court finds that plaintiff
does not meet the requirements for
disability benefits under the disability
policy, the Court does not reach the issue
of preemption
FN4 Memorandum m Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, R Doc 14, Exh
Aatp 3
FN5 Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p 6, R Doc 14
FN6 Memorandum m Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, Exh E, R Doc
14
ED La,1996
Danna, Sr v CNA Ins Co
Not Reported in F Supp, 1996 WL 180058
(EDLa)
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top)

Accordmgly,

• 2 95cv03061 (Docket) (Sep 18, 1995)

IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED

END OF DOCUMENT
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2a-3

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part I. Courts
K
& Chapter 2A. Court of Appeals
-•§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
issue all writs and process necessary:

to issue all extraordinary writs and

to

(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has
interlocutory appeals, over:

appellate

jurisdiction,

including

jurisdiction

of

(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
of state agencies
or appeals
from the district
court
review of
informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission,
State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees,
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining,
and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings
or other local agencies; and

of agencies

of political

subdivisions

of the

state

(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

cases,

those

except

involving

a

(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including,
but not
limited
to, divorce, annulment, property
division,
child
custody,
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply
46b,
Administrative
Procedures
Act,
proceedings.

with the
in
its

requirements
review
of

of Title 63, Chapter
agency
adjudicative

Laws 1986, c. 47, § 46; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 304; Laws 1988, c.
1988, c. 210, § 141; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 8; Laws 1990, c. 80, §
c. 224, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 22; Laws 1992, c. 127, § 12;
13, § 45; Laws 1995, c. 299, § 47, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996,
eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 49, eff. July 1, 1996;
255, § 20, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 302, § 2, eff. April 30,

73, § 1; Laws
5; Laws 1990,
Laws 1994, c.
c. 159, § 19,
Laws 2001, c.
2001.

CROSS REFERENCES
Military court, see §§ 39-6-15 and 39-6-16.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Administrative Law and Procedure C^>651 to 686, 721 to 726.
Courts €=3207, 248, 483 to 488.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k207; 106k248; 15Ak651 to 15Ak686; 15Ak721
to 15Ak726; 106k483 to 106k488.
C.J.S. Courts §§ 193 to 202.
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 172 to 201, 204, 208 to 212,
218 to 219, 259 to 271.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Treatises and Practice Aids
150 BNA Daily Report for Executives K-16, 1999, Property Taxes: Facts.
150 BNA Daily Tax Report K-16, 1999, Property Taxes: Facts.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Appellate jurisdiction,
Adoption,
jurisdiction
of
Supreme
Court,
review
of
state
interpretation
of state law, due process, see O'Connell v. Kirchner, U.S.Ill.1995, 115
S.Ct. 891, 513 U.S. 1303, 130 L.Ed.2d 873.

court's

NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1
Administrative entity determinations 5
Appeals from courts not of record 3
Attorney fees 8
Criminal convictions 6
Extradition orders 7
Final judgments and orders 4
Issuance of prerogative or remedial writs 9
Mandamus 10
Original appellate jurisdiction, generally 2
1. In general
District court did not have appellate jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to
circuit court orders binding defendants over for trial, in absence of any
statutory delegation of appellate jurisdiction to district court; legislature
vested appellate jurisdiction over circuit court proceedings in Court of Appeals.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-15, 77-35-7, 78-2a-3(2)(d), 78-3- 4(5). State v. Humphrey,
1990, 794 P.2d 496, certiorari granted 804 P.2d 1232, reversed 823 P.2d 464.
Criminal Law €^> 1018
Failure of defendant to file direct appeal before seeking postconviction relief
was not a jurisdictional defect which would prevent the Court of Appeals from
reviewing the district court's decision denying habeas corpus. U.C.A.1953,
78-2a-3(f). Gomm v. Cook, 1988, 754 P.2d 1226. Habeas Corpus €^=> 813
2. Original appellate jurisdiction, generally
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over a district court's
review of a city council's decisions on zoning issues. U.C.A.1953, 78-2- 2(3) (j),
78-2a-3(2) (b) (i) . Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001, 17 P.3d 1160, 412 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26, 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2001 UT App 9, certiorari granted 26 P. 3d 235,
vacated 70 P.3d 47, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2003 UT 16. Zoning And Planning €^> 741
3. Appeals from courts not of record
Magistrate was not "court of record, " and thus Court of Appeals did not have
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal from magistrate's order binding defendant
over for trial on refiled felony charge. Const. Art. 8, § 5; U.C.A.1953,
78-2a-3(2)(d). State v. Fisk, 1998, 966 P.2d 860, 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 34.
Criminal Law €=> 1023(3)
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4. Final judgments and orders
Employer's petition for review was filed prematurely with Court of Appeals, before
Labor
Commission's
final
agency
action
denying
employer's
motion
for
reconsideration of award in favor of injured worker, despite fact that employer
filed within statutorily specified period after motion was "considered denied" by
Commission's inaction on motion, where Commission could and did change "considered
denied" date to later date, and thus, Court lacked jurisdiction to consider
employer's
appeal.
U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-l(9),
63-46b-13(3) (b),
78-2a-3 (2) (a) .
McCoy v. Utah Disaster Kleenup, 2003, 65 P. 3d 643, 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 2003 UT
App 49. Workers' Compensation €^> 1875
5. Administrative entity determinations
Labor Commission's interim order finding that workers' compensation claimant
qualified for permanent total disability was not final and appealable order, even
though administrative rule stated that preliminary determination of permanent
total disability, by Labor Commission or Appeals Board, was final agency action
for purposes of appellate judicial review, where statute, which controlled over
administrative rule, provided that finding by Commission of permanent total
disability was not final, unless otherwise agreed by parties, until reemployment
plan was prepared and considered, and parties agreed this had not occurred.
Target Trucking v. Labor Com'n, 2005, 108 P. 3d 128, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 2005 UT
App 70. Workers' Compensation €^> 1833
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over district court review of
land use decisions by local government entities, since Supreme Court has original
appellate jurisdiction over orders over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original jurisdiction, and Court of Appeals did not have original jurisdiction to
hear challenges to land use decisions by municipal governing bodies; there was no
statutory provision that expressly granted the Court of Appeals original
jurisdiction over district court review of land use decisions by local
governmental entities. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). Bradley v. Payson City
Corp., 2003, 70 P.3d 47, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2003 UT 16. Courts €^> 206(17.1)
Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider company's petition for
review regarding conversion of citation proceeding based on hiring of unlicensed
electricians to perform electrical construction work from informal to formal
adjudicative proceeding by Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing; conversion order was not final order. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16, 78-2a-3(2) (a); U.C.A.1953(1993 Ed.), 58- 55-2(32) (C). Merit Elec. &
Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, 1995, 902 P. 2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure €^> 704; Licenses
€=^> 41
Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review orders that reserve
something for further decision by agency. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16, 78-2a-3(2)(a).
Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, 1995, 902 P.2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure €=>
704
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"Collateral order doctrine," which allows review of orders that conclusively
determine disputed question, resolve important issue completely separate from
merits of action, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment
would not be applied to appeal from administrative action. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16,
78-2a-3(2) (a). Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of
Occupational and Professional Licensing, 1995, 902 P. 2d 151. Administrative Law
And Procedure €==> 7 04
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary writ challenging
denial of motion to recuse presiding officer of Division of Environmental Response
and Remediation
(DERR) based on fact that presiding officer was also staff
attorney. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l(3) (a), 78-2a-3 (1) (b) . V-l Oil Co. v. Department
of Environmental Quality, Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1995, 893 P. 2d 1093,
certiorari granted 910 P. 2d 425, reversed 939 P. 2d 1192, 317 Utah Adv. Rep. 11.
Administrative Law And Procedure €==> 657.1; Environmental Law €=> 634
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review decision by division of police
officer standards and training (POST) not to pursue decertification of wildlife
conservation officer; since POST did not conduct any formal proceedings, there
was no final order resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, and citizen's
filing of complaint with POST did not require it to conduct formal proceedings.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l et seq., 63-46b-16, 78-2a-3 (2) (a). Nielson v. Division of
Peace Officer Standards and Training, (POST), Dept. of Public Safety, 1993, 851
P.2d 1201. Administrative Law And Procedure €^> 704; Game €=> 6
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to rule on whether the Tax Commission complied
with remand order of the Supreme Court, notwithstanding claim of Commission that
its decision on remand was not a final appealable order because decision called
for a further proceeding; appeal was an enforcement proceeding to determine if
Commission complied with remand order, and Supreme Court has jurisdiction by
statute to issue all process necessary to carry into effect its orders; since
case was transferred, Court of Appeals stood m
shoes of Supreme Court.
U.C.A.1953, 78-2-2(2), 78-2a-3 (1) (a) , (2) (k) . Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State
Tax Com'n, 1993, 848 P.2d 715, certiorari granted 860 P.2d 943, reversed 874 P.2d
840. Taxation €=^> 2693
Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction, pursuant to statute granting Court
jurisdiction to review final agency actions resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings, to review Division of Occupational and Professional Licensingfs
administrative law judge's denial of motion to dismiss unprofessional conduct
petitions filed against person licensed to administer health facility, even though
licensee had petitioned to have order reviewed by Division and such review was
denied.
U.C.A.1953,
13-1-12 (1) (a),
63-46b-16(1) .
Barney
v.
Division
of
Occupational and Professional Licensing, Dept. of Commerce, 1992, 828 P. 2d 542,
certiorari denied 843 P.2d 516. Health €==> 223(1)
Court
of Appeals
would
not
defer
ruling
on
jurisdictional
issue
until
consideration of merits of appeal from administrative law judge's denial of motion
to dismiss professional conduct petitions filed against person licensed to
administer health facility, since Court's first duty was to determine whether it
had jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953, 13-1-12 (1) (a), 63-46b-16 (1) . Barney v. Division of
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Occupational and Professional Licensing, Dept. of Commerce,
certiorari denied 843 P.2d 516. Health €=^ 223(1)

1992, 828

P. 2d 542,

Statute giving the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over final orders and
decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them defines the outermost limit of the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction
and allows it to review agency decisions only when the legislature expressly
autho-rizes a right of review. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3 (2) (a) . DeBry v. Salt Lake
County Bd. of Appeals, 1988, 764 P. 2d 627. Administrative Law And Procedure €=>
663; Administrative Law And Procedure 0=? 681.1
In the absence of specific statute creating right to judicial review of order of
county board of appeals, Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953,
78-2a-3(2)(a). DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 1988, 764 P.2d 627.
Administrative Law And Procedure €=> 663
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear appeal from district court order
affirming administrative suspension of license to operate a cosmetology/barbering
school. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3; U.C.A.1953, 58-1-36 (Repealed); Const. Art. 8, § 5
; Const. Art. 8, § 9 (Repealed); Court of Appeals Rule 4A. Scientific Academy
of Hair Design, Inc. v. Bowen, 1987, 738 P.2d 242. Administrative Law And
Procedure C^> 681.1; Licenses C ^ 38
6. Criminal convictions
Statefs ability to take appeal in criminal case is limited. Rules Crim.Proc,
Rule 26(3). State v. Quinn, 1996, 930 P.2d 267, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 309 Utah
Adv. Rep. 11, rehearing denied. Criminal Law €=> 1024(1)
State could not take interlocutory appeal of magistrate's order denying its
request to enhance defendant's driving under the influence
(DUI) charge to
third-degree felony, as order did not fit within any of categories of appealable
decisions. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(3). State v. Quinn, 1996, 930 P.2d 267, 305
Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 309 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, rehearing denied. Criminal Law £=>
1024(9)
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions
for
extraordinary writ which challenge the conviction of or sentence for first-degree
felony or capital felony. U.C.A.1953, 78-2-2 (3) (j), 78-2a-3 (2) (h) . Neel v.
Holden, 1994, 886 P.2d 1097. Habeas Corpus €=> 813
Because
appealed
Supreme
820 P.2d

petitioner was not challenging his conviction or sentence, he should have
dismissal of his habeas corpus petition to Court of Appeals rather than
Court. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 1991,
473. Courts €==> 248

Supreme Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of first degree or capital
felony conviction and over petition for extraordinary writ used as substitute for
direct appeal of such conviction or sentence; Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
in all other cases. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3 (2) (g) . Northern v. Barnes, 1991, 814
P.2d 1148, certiorari granted 843 P.2d 1042. Courts €=> 248; Criminal Law €=?
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1018; Criminal Law €=> 1019; Criminal Law €=? 1020
Writ challenging postconviction actions of Board of Pardons was properly before
Court of Appeals where it did not challenge conviction in trial court or sentence;
fact that defendant was serving sentence for first-degree felony did not require
transfer to Supreme Court. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Northern v. Barnes, 1991,
814 P.2d 1148, certiorari granted 843 P.2d 1042. Courts €==> 248
When sentencing judge reduces conviction, appeal lies in court having jurisdiction
of degree of crime recorded in judgment of conviction and for which defendant is
sentenced, rather than degree of crime charged in information or found in verdict.
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-402, 78-2-2(3)(i), 78-2a-3(2)(f). State v. Doung, 1991, 813
P.2d 1168. Criminal Law €=> 1019
Under statute granting Court of Appeals original appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs "involving a criminal
conviction," Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of appeal
from denial of extraordinary writ involving an interstate transfer of a prisoner,
which bore no relation to the underlying criminal conviction except that, "but
for" the conviction, he would not have been incarcerated in Arizona and then
transferred to Utah. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3, 78-2a-3 (2) (g) . Ellis v. DeLand, 1989,
783 P.2d 559, transferred to 786 P.2d 231. Habeas Corpus €^> 813
7. Extradition orders
Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction over appeal by prisoner held for
extradition to Idaho in Utah county jail from district court's denial of
prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to statute providing
subject matter jurisdiction of appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs involving criminal convictions; language of the statute is sufficiently
broad to include those cases in which criminal conviction is involved in habeas
corpus proceeding to challenge extradition. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3 (2) (g) . Hernandez
v. Hayward, 1988, 764 P. 2d 993. Habeas Corpus €==> 813
8. Attorney fees
When party who prevails on appeal in divorce action, yet was not awarded fees at
trial, claims attorney fees on appeal solely on basis of new allegations of change
in financial condition and those allegations are not a matter of record and have
not been adjudicated by finder of fact, Court of Appeals cannot evaluate claim;
prevailing party's claim for attorney fees on appeal based on allegation of need
must be addressed by trial court to determine need of claiming spouse, ability of
other spouse to pay, reasonableness of fees and amount, if any, to be paid.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3, 78-2a-3. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 1994, 875 P.2d 598.
Divorce €=> 287
9. Issuance of prerogative or remedial writs
Supreme Court had jurisdiction, under statutory exception to Court of Appeals'
jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs
challenging decisions of Board of Pardons, to hear original direct appeal from
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

UT ST § 78-2a-3

Page 8

U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2a-3
district court's unconditional order of release on prisoner's petition challenging
decision made at his original parole grant hearing which fixed length of his
prison
stay
for
two
first-degree
felonies.
U.C.A.1953,
78-22(3) (j),
78-2a-3 (2) (g, h) ; Rules App.Proc, Rule 44. Preece v. House, 1994, 886 P.2d 508.
Courts €=> 248
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary writ; by
issuing writ sought by petition, court would only be carrying into effect its
judgments, orders and decree in previous cases directing judge to comply with Rule
63(b) with respect to several of petitioner's cases. U.C.A.1953, 78- 2a-3(l)(a);
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 63(b). Barnard v. Murphy, 1994, 882 P.2d 679. Courts €=>
207.1
Where Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over subject matter of divorce
case in which petitioner who filed petition for extraordinary writ had been a
party, Court of Appeals had authority to issue necessary writs in connection with
that case, even if no appeal was pending. U.C.A. 1953, 78- 2a-3(l) (b) . Barnard v.
Murphy, 1994, 882 P.2d 679. Courts €^> 207.1

10. Mandamus
Court's decision to grant or deny petition for extraordinary relief in nature of
mandamus is discretionary with court to which petition is brought, in sense that
it is never matter of right on behalf of applicant. V-l Oil Co. v. Department of
Environmental Quality, Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1997, 939 P. 2d 1192, 317
Utah Adv. Rep. 11. Mandamus C=^> 7
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2a-3, UT ST § 78-2a-3

Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session

Copr © 2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

V\||5aw
Page 1
15U.S.C.A. §1127

Effective: March 29,2000
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 15. Commerce and Trade
"i Chapter 22. Trademarks (Refs & Annos)
*i Subchapter III. General Provisions
-•§ 1127. Construction and definitions; intent of chapter
In the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the contextThe United States includes and embraces all territory which is under its jurisdiction and control.
The word "commerce" means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.
The term "principal register" refers to the register provided for by sections 1051 to 1072 of this title, and the term
"supplemental register" refers to the register provided for by sections 1091 to 1096 of this title.
The term "person" and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or
privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural
person. The term "juristic person" includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable
of suing and being sued in a court of law.
The term "person" also includes the United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or
corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States. The United
States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, and any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States
and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the
same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
The term "person" also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or
employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity.
The terms "applicant" and "registrant" embrace the legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns of
such applicant or registrant.
The term "Director" means the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office.
The term "related company" means any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with
respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.
The terms "trade name" and "commercial name" mean any name used by a person to identify his or her business or
vocation.
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The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register
established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
The term "service mark" means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register
established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others and to
indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other distinctive
features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the
programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.
The term "certification mark" means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof(1) used by a person other than its owner, or
(2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce and
files an application to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such
person's goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union
or other organization.
The term "collective mark" means a trademark or service mark—
(1) used by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization, or
(2) which such cooperative, association, or other collective group or organization has a bona fide intention to use
in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an association, or other organization.
The term "mark" includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark.
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in
commerce-(1) on goods when(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the
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tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on
documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in
commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and
the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" if either of the following occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred
from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. "Use" of a
mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve
a right in a mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark
to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to
lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this
paragraph.
The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of—
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
The term "colorable imitation" includes any mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive.
The term "registered mark" means a mark registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office under this
chapter or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or the Act of March 19, 1920. The
phrase "marks registered in the Patent and Trademark Office" means registered marks.
The term "Act of March 3, 1881", "Act of February 20, 1905", or "Act of March 19, 1920", means the respective
Act as amended.
A "counterfeit" is a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.
The term "domain name" means any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic address
on the Internet.
The term "Internet" has the meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of Title 47.
Words used in the singular include the plural and vice versa.
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair
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competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or
colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions
respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign
nations.
CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1946, c. 540, Title X, § 45, 60 Stat. 443; Oct. 9, 1962, Pub.L. 87-772, § 21, 76 Stat. 774; Jan. 2, 1975,
Pub.L. 93-596, § 1, 88 Stat. 1949; Nov. 8, 1984, Pub.L. 98-620, Title I, § 103, 98 Stat. 3335; Nov. 16, 1988,
Pub.L. 100-667, Title I, § 134, 102 Stat. 3946; Oct. 27, 1992, Pub.L. 102-542, § 3(d), 106 Stat. 3568; Dec. 8,
1994, Pub.L. 103-465, Title V, § 521, 108 Stat. 4981; Jan. 16, 1996, Pub.L. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 986; Aug. 5,
1999, Pub.L. 106-43, §§ 4(c), 6(b), 113 Stat. 219, 220; Nov. 29, 1999, Pub.L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9) [Title
III, § 3005, Title IV, § 4732(b)(1)(A)], 113 Stat. 1536,1501A-550,1501A-583.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1946 Acts. Senate Report No. 1333, see 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Service, p. 1274.
1962 Acts. Senate Report No. 2107, see 1962 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 2844.
1975 Acts. Senate Report No. 93-1399, see 1974 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 7113.
1984 Acts. House Report No. 98-1062, see 1984 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 5708.
1988 Acts. Senate Report No. 100-515 and House Report No. 100-887(Parts I and II), see 1988 U.S. Code Cong,
and Adm. News, p. 5577.
1992 Acts. Senate Report No. 102-280, see 1992 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 3087.
1994 Acts. House Report No. 103-826(Parts I and II) and Statement of Administrative Action, see 1994 U.S. Code
Cong, and Adm. News, p. 3773.
1996 Acts. House Report No. 104-374, see 1995 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 1029.
1999 Acts. Statement by President, see 1999 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 290.
References in Text
"This chapter", referred to in text, originally read "this Act", meaning the Trademark Act of 1946, which is
classified principally to this chapter. See Tables for complete classification.
Acts March 3, 1881, February 20, 1905, and March 19, 1920, referred to in text, are Acts Mar. 3, 1881, c. 138, 21
Stat. 502; Feb. 20, 1905, c. 592, 33 Stat. 724; and Mar. 19, 1920, c. 104, 41 Stat. 553, which were repealed
insofar as inconsistent with this chapter by act July 5, 1946, c. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444. Act Feb. 20, 1905, was
classified to §§ 81 to 109 of this title. Act Mar. 19, 1920, had been generally classified to §§ 121 to 128 of this
title.
Amendments
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1999 Amendments. Pub.L. 106-113 [Title III, § 3004], inserted after the undesignated paragraph defining the term
"counterfeit" the following:
"The term 'domain name' means any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic address
on the Internet.
"The term 'Internet' has the meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of Title 47."
Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 4732(b)(1)(A)], struck out the par. which read: "The term 'Commissioner' means the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks", and inserted "The term 'Director' means the Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office".
Pub.L. 106-43, § 4(c), added the par. in the definition of "person" relating to the United States.
Pub.L. 106-43, § 6(b), struck out "trade-marks" and inserted "trademarks" each place it appeared.
1996 Amendments. Pub.L. 104-98, § 4, added provisions defining term "dilution" as the lessening of the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception.
1994 Amendments. Pub.L. 103-465, § 521, in provision defining "abandoned" substituted provision that nonuse
for 3 consecutive years be prima facie evidence of abandonment for provision that nonuse for two consecutive
years be prima facie evidence of abandonment.
1992 Amendments. Pub.L. 102-542 inserted after fourth undesignated paragraph "The term 'person' also includes
any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting
in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the
provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity."
1988 Amendments. Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(1), amended par. defining "related company" generally. Prior to
amendment, par. read as follows: "The teim 'related company1 means any person who legitimately controls or is
controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services
in connection with which the mark is used."
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(2), amended par. defining "trade name" and "commercial name" generally. Prior to
amendment, par. read as follows: "The terms 'trade name' and 'commercial name' include individual names and
surnames, firm names and trade names used by manufacturers, industrialists, merchants, agriculturists, and others
to identify their businesses, vocations, or occupations; the names or titles lawfully adopted and used by persons,
firms, associations, corporations, companies, unions, and any manufacturing, industrial, commercial, agricultural,
or other organizations engaged in trade or commerce and capable of suing and being sued in a court of law."
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(3), amended par. defining "trademark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as follows:
"The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used
by a manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(4), amended par. defining "service mark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as
follows: "The term 'service mark' means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify and
distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the
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source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names and other distinctive features of
radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may
advertise the goods of the sponsor."
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(5), amended par. defining "certification mark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as
follows: "The term 'certification mark' means a mark used upon or in connection with the products or services of
one or more persons other than the owner of the mark to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of
manufacture, quality, accuracy or other characteristics of such goods or services or that the work or labor on the
goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization."
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(6), amended par. defining "collective mark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as
follows: "The term 'collective mark' means a trademark or service mark used by the members of a cooperative, an
association or other collective group or organization and includes marks used to indicate membership in a union,
an association or other organization."
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(7), amended par. defining "mark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as follows:
"The term 'mark' includes any trade-mark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark entitled to
registration under this chapter whether registered or not."
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(8), substituted par. defining "use in commerce" for former par. which read as follows: "For
the purposes of this chapter a mark shall be deemed to be used in commerce (a) on goods when it is placed in any
manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto
and the goods are sold or transported in commerce and (b) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one
State or in this and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection
therewith." and par. providing when a mark is deemed abandoned for former par. which read as follows: "A mark
shall be deemed to be 'abandoned'-"(a) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume. Intent not to resume may be inferred from
circumstances. Nonuse for two consecutive years shall be prima facie abandonment.
"(b) When any course of conduct of the registrant, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the
mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining
abandonment under this subparagraph."
1984 Amendments. Pub.L. 98-620, § 103(1), in definition of "trademark" substituted "trademark" for
"trade-mark", and substituted "identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown" for
"identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others".
Pub.L. 98-620, § 103(2), in definition of "service mark" substituted "The tenn 'service mark' means a mark used in
the sale or advertising of services to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service,
from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown" for "The term
'service mark' means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and
distinguish them from the services of others".
Pub.L. 98-620, § 103(3), in subpar. (b) of par. relating to when a mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned",
inserted "Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this subparagraph."
1975 Amendments. Pub.L. 93-596 substituted "Patent and Trademark Office" for "Patent Office" in two places and
"Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks" for "Commissioner of Patents" in the definition of "Commissioner".
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1962 Amendments. Pub.L. 87-772 substituted, "predecessors," for "and" in the definition of "applicant" and
"registrant", "Titles, character names and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be
registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor" for
"and includes without limitation the marks, names, symbols, titles, designations, slogans, character names, and
distinctive features of radio or other advertising used in commerce", in the definition of "service mark", inserted
"or the services are rendered in more than one State or in this and a foreign country and the person rendering the
services is engaged in commerce in connection therewith" in the fifteenth paragraph relating to use in commerce,
struck out "purchasers" after "deceive" in the definition of "colorable imitation", and substituted "commerce" for
"commence" in last paragraph relating to the intent of the chapter.
Effective and Applicability Provisions
1999 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 3005] to apply to all domain names registered before, on, or after the
date of enactment of this Act [Nov. 29, 1999, which is the date of enactment of Pub.L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501,
which in Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), enacted into law this Act as an Appendix], see Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 3010], set out as a
note under section 1117 of this title.
Amendment by Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 4732(b)(1)(A)], effective 4 months after the date of enactment of this Act [Nov.
29, 1999, which is the date of enactment of Pub.L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, which in Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), enacted
into law this Act as an Appendix], see Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 4731], set out as a note under section 1 of Title 35.
1996 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 104-98 effective on Jan. 16, 1996, see section 5 of Pub.L. 104-98, set out as a
note under section 1125 of this title.
1994 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 103-465 effective one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement enters
into force with respect to the United States [Jan. 1, 1995], see section 523 of Pub.L. 103-465, set out as a note
under section 1052 of this title.
1992 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 102-542 effective with respect to violations that occur on or after Oct. 27, 1992,
see section 4 of Pub.L. 102-542, set out as a note under section 1114 of this title.
1988 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 100-667 effective one year after Nov. 16, 1988, see section 136 of Pub.L.
100-667, set out as a note under section 1051 of this title.
1975 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 93-596 effective Jan. 2, 1975, see § 4 of Pub.L. 93-596, set out as a note under §
1111 of this title.
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions of other officers, employees, and agencies of the Department of Commerce, with certain
exceptions, to the Secretary of Commerce, with power to delegate, see Reorg. Plan No. 5 of 1950, §§ 1,2, eff. May
24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1263, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
Repeal and Effect on Existing Rights
Repeal of inconsistent provisions, effect of this chapter on pending proceedings and existing registrations and
rights under prior acts, see notes under § 1051 of this title.
Prior Provisions
Acts Feb. 20,1905, c. 592, § 29, 33 Stat. 731; June 10, 1938, c. 332, § 5, 52 Stat. 639.
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CROSS REFERENCES

Customs duties, forfeitures and penalty for aiding unlawful importation, see 19 USCA § 1595a.
Seizure of merchandise bearing counterfeit mark, see 19 USCA § 1526.
LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES
A dilution delusion: The unjustifiable protection of similar marks. Comment, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1023
(2004).
A primer on trademarks and service marks. Lawrence E. Evans, Jr., 18 St.Mary's L.J. 137 (1986).
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c
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
-4RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evxdence. When issues not raised by the pleading
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to
be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the
objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be
granted even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim
for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party
plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time
therefor.
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c
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART IV. PARTIES
-•RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of
an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for
the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's
name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when
a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be
brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the
ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement
of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and
such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
(b) Minors or Incompetent Persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent person who
is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem
appointed in the particular case by the court in which the action is pending. A
guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in
which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor,
insane or incompetent person in the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that the
person m a y have a general guardian and may have appeared by the guardian. In an
action in rem it shall not b e necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any
unKnown party who might be a minor or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian Ad Litem; How Appointed.
must be appointed as follows:

A

guardian

ad

litem

appointed

by

a

court

(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor
is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application of a
relative or friend of the minor.
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is
of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the service of the
summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so to apply, then upon the
application of a relative or friend of the minor, or of any other party to the
action.
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion
therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable person to be
guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or someone in
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behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of notice of such motion
shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such minor. Service of such notice may
be made upon the defendant's general or testamentary guardian located in the
defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with the summons in
the action, shall be served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon
such minor, if over fourteen years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by
such service on the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad litem for
such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days after appointment in which to
plead to the action.
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding,
upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or incompetent person,
or of any other party to the action or proceeding.
(d) Associates May Sue or Be Sued b y Common Name. When two or more persons
associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other
association,
not
a corporation, transact
such business
under
a common name,
whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue or be sued
by such common name. Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the
joint property of all the associates in the same manner as if all had been named
parties and had been sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of an
individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the
member is named as a party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member.

(e) Action Against a Nonresident Doing Business in This State. When a nonresident
person is associated in and conducts business within the state of Utah in one or
more places in that person's own name or a common trade name, and the business is
conducted under the supervision of a manager, superintendent or agent the person
may be sued in the person's name in any action arising out of the conduct of the
business.
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the
term defendant shall include a respondent.
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